




















--jj'~ K.iS.E. Í ~,,
~ BIBLIOTHEEK
TILBURG




'Center for Econorruc Hesearch. Tilburg lniversity. P.0 Box 90153. 5000 LE Tilburg. The `ether-
lands I would like to thank Helmut Bester for óis advice. I also benefited from helpíul comments made
b~ Enc can Damme. Dave Furth, Andreas Ortmann. Johan Stennek, and Frank Verboven.Abstract
This paper studies a market in which firms can choose to sell either by a retail
store or by a mail otder business. For the consumer, purchases made at retail stores
entail transportaiion costs that increase with distance. In contrast, a consumer
served by mail order businesses pays a fixed cost, irtespective ofhis or her location.
This paper considers monopoly, oligopoly, free entry, and the social optimum. In
the free-entry case, at most one mail order óusiness emerges in equilibrium. In
Ihe free-en[rv equilibrium with a mail order business, competition is more fierce,
compared to the well-known Salop-model, without mail order business. Therefore,
fewer firms are active in equilibrium. In contrast with the free-entry case, the
monopolist and the social planner never open both stores and a mail order business
at the sarne time.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the equilibrium structure of an industry in which firms sell a
homogeneous good at mill prices by two alternative methods. The first method consists
of opening a retail store, which consumers can visit by paying a linear transportation
cost. In the spatial price terminology, this method is called 'uniform Free-On-Board
(FOB) pricing.'' The other method involves setting up a'mail order business,~ where
consumers are served by paying a fixed cost, irrespective their initial location. The mail
order business serves its c,onsumers by some exogenous technology, e.g. a postal service.
Both selling policies have in common that none of the firms bears transportation costs.
They differ, however, in their impact on consumers' decisions. When a consumer buys
at a retail store. his total expenditure equals the price at retail plus his transportation
cost to the retail store. In contrast, all consumers buying at the mail order business
have the same total expenditure. The store's selling policy implies uniformity of the
price only at the store. The mail order business's selling policy implies uniformity of the
price -- not only at the mail order business, but also at the place of delivery: that is.
the consumer~s home location. The fixed transportation cost implies that a price change
affects every consumer equally. Location, therefore, becomes completel} irrelevant when
selling occurs by a mail order business. ~larkets in which consumers are served by
stores and~or mail order businesses include the following: books. clothing. computers.Z
flowerbulbs, photographic developing, records, banking and insurance products, etc... .
This paper aims to investigate the conditions and properties of an industry with the
above characteristics.
The anah-sis adds a mail order business to the standard circle model à la Salop (1979).
I characterize the protected monopol};3 the oligopol}' and free entr}~ equilibrium, and the
social optimum. It is never optimal for the monopolist to offer at the same time both
selling policies. i.e. stores and a mail order business. ~~'ith free entry. onl}~ one store or
'In d~scussing this spatial price policy. Phlips (1983) remarks "In an} event. the net producer pnce
(after deduction of freight) is the same whatever the destination. since at any point of delivery the
delivered price is equal to the factorv price plus actual carriage costs'~ (p 2d).
-1n 1991. 229C of all miuocomputers in the C~S were sold through the mail (see ~fc~5"illiams (1991)).
3i e a monopolist 'who dces not face the threat of entry' (Bonanno (198ï). p 39).2
mail order business is allowed per firm. If the set-up cost is large relative to the margínal
transportation cost, no mail order business appears. However, at most one mail order
business emerges in equilibrium. The presence of a mail order business implies more
competition, compared to the original Salop-model. As a result, a smaller number of
firms is active in equilibrium. Finally, in the social optimum, it is never optimal to offer
both selling policies at the same time.
The importance of mail order businesses varies between countries. In terms of per
capita expenditures for 1991, it ranges from ~23 in Italy. to ~w273 in the L'nited States.
As a percentage of the total turnover in the non-food retail trade in 1991, the mail order
industry represented fi.1clc in France, 4.7Q1c in Sweden, and in the total retail trade, ~1.ïcic
in the Federal Republic of Germany." These figures, however, take no account of the
importance of the mail order business in a particular industry. They include industries
where no mail order business exists. Excluding these industries will increase the mail
order industr}''s share.
The subject of the paper clearly differs from Thisse and ~-ives (1988), in which firms
make strategic choices in terms of spatial price policy. Thisse and Vives consider two
price policies: uniform FOB pricing and discriminatory pricing. They find "a robust
tendencv for a firm to choose the discriminatory policy" (p. 134). In footnote 8. they
remark: "let us emphasize the fact that what we call here uniform pricing is different from
uniform delivered pricing as defined in postage stamp systems.'~ This paper takes these
two variants of uniform pricing as the available strategic choices for selling products.
.~ mai] order business can serve the entire market without affecting the consumer's
cost of being served. This differs from uniform zone pricing in at least two ways. First,
uniform zone pricing implies that every consumer within a well-defined region is charged
the same price. Actual transportation costs. however, are borne by the firm. By choosing
such a pricing policy, the firm faces a minimization problem for its total transportation
costs. Second, the larger the market that is being served. the larger the average trans-
portation cost is. Therefore, and in contrast with the mail order business, location
4Source :~'RC Handetsólad. June 30, 1993 and European .11at! Order Trade .9ssoceatoon. Key Figures
1991.3
matters under uniform zone pricing.
The economics literature on spatial structure in the retail trade where fixed vs. linear
transportation costs appear in a strategic context is rather scarce.s Heal (1980) studies
a circle model in which consumers can buy either from the producer at the center or
from a store on the circumference. Also the store. however, has to buy its products from
the producer at the center. Due to increasing returns to scale in transportation costs,
the outer store can develop a comparatíve advantage vis-à-vis the consumers. Lewis
(1943) takes account of forms of retailing in which consumers do not visit the stores
but order by telephone or by mail. He remarks that this kind of retailing is "convenient
if the customer knows what he wants ..."(p.216). Henriet and Rochet (1991) discuss a
circle model in which consumers can buy insurance either directly from the company
(located at the center of the circle) or from one of its intermediaries (located on the
circle). Buying from the direct writer implies a fixed cost for the consumer, regardless of
his location. The alternative is to buy from the nearest intermediary. They investigate
the influence of different vertical restraints on the equilibrium outcome.
One recent article in the economics literature on mail order businesses versus retail
stores is ~Iichael (199~). He uses the theory of transaction costs to explain marketing
channels. His analysis focusses on differences in costs of physical distribution and of
informing the consumers in mail order businesses and retail stores. Changes over time in
these costs significanth- affected the sales of mail order businesses. The empirical results
also support the assertion that a higher density of population makes retailing relati~'ely
more ad~~antageous.
[n contrast tsith the economics literature. the marketing and retailing literature fo-
cusses on the mail order industr~~ (see e.g. Darian (198ï)). The central theme is on the
relationship between demographic characteristics at the household level and (mail orderl
shopping beha~.ior. This paper studies the impact of selling by' a mail order business
'There is, however. a considerable body of literature on endogenous (spatial) pricing policies Spiegel
(1982) demonstrates that sellers preter the 'meet the competition' policy to uniform delivered pricing
and mill pricing. Furlong and Slotsce (1983) show that a monopohst can increase profits when the choice
is available between mill and uniform delivered pricing. In a different context. Bester (1993) analyzes
whether posted prices or negotiated pricing will emerge in a market with quality uncertainty.4
on competition with retail stores. In the same line as the cited article by Thisse and
~'ives, the analysis stresses that "current business practices refiect a strategicpositioning
of firms in the market" (p. 122).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the
optimal structure for a monopolist. In order to focus on strategic interactions between
firms, section 4 studies the oligopoly case. Section ~ considers the equilibrium market
structure in a free-entry context. Section 6 addresses a welfare analysis. Finally, section
ï contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a market for a homogeneous product. Vlarginal cost of production is constant
and without loss of generality normalized at zero. Each firm, indexed by i- 1, ..., .V, can
choose from a set of two strategies to market the product. The first is the traditional way
of opening a single store. At this store, consumers are charged a uniform mill price p, ~ 0.
Each consumer located at distance z from the store, bears the linear transportation cost
tz 1 0. I use the Salop (19i9) circle model, where firms are located equidistant from
each other. The second strategy is to open a mail order business, where consumers can
order the product (b}' mail) at a mill price q, ? 0 plus a non-negative fixed cost Y(e.g.
the price of the stamp) for sending the product to the consumer's location. This fixed
cost ~ is assumed to be independent of one~s location and not susceptible to (strategic)
manipulation by any of the players.s One possible interpretation is that the mail order
business is located at the center of the circle. The radius of the circle then represents
the fixed cost y.
There is a unit mass of consumers whose initial locations are uniformlv distributed
on a circle with densitt~ one. The consumers buv from that firm that offers the lowest
full price. i.e. mill price plus fixed or linear transportation cost. Each consumer has the
same reserration price r and bucs at most one unit of the good.
óThe model assumes that price disaimination based on the consumer's address is illegal. This seems
reasonable if the analvsis concentrates on competition w~ithin one country.5
3 Monopoly
Consider a protected monopolist who can make use of both selling policies. The mo-
nopolist decides on the number of stores on the circle, whether to set up a mail order
business and, for each of these selling policies, what prices to charge. There is an iden-
tical positive set-up cost F for every mail order business and each store on the circle.
Assume that r~ t so that, with onl}' one store on the circle, it is in the monopolist's
interest to serve the whole market. In addition, assume that r~ cp, so that a mail order
business can operate for some positive set-up cost.
Lemma 1: Ij the monopolist can only open stores on the circle, his profit equals
mar(0, r- 2tF), and 0.5t~F is the optimal number oj stores.
Proof: Store i's marginal consumer, located at i, is defined by the equation p, f-fi - r.
This implies that the monopolist's profit function is 2n~i(r - ti) - n~F, with n~ the
number of stores on the circle. blaximize this with respect to x, and the function is
increasing as long as r~ 2ti. From the assumptions of symmetry and r~ t, 0.5 C i
at r- 2ti. Therefore, with n~ 1 I stores, the monopolist finds it optimal to serve
the whole market, such that i - 0.~~n~, and the profit function becomes r - 0.5t~n~ -
n~F. ~taximizing with respect to n~ yields an optímal number of n~ - 0.5t~F. .after
substitution. the profit equals r- 2tF. If this profit is larger than zero, the monopolist
opens a number of 0.5t~F stores on the circle. Otherwise. the monopolist stay-s out of
the market. 0
Lemma 2: Assume that the monopolist cannot open stores on the circle. IJ r- Y~ F,
the monopolist opens one (and only one) mail order óusiness. Otheru~ise, he opens no
mail order business at all.
Proof: If the monopolist opens nm ? I mail order businesses, his profit equals (r- Y)-
nmF. Therefore. opening more than one store would only reduce profits. If r-~,-F ~ 0.
the monopolist opens only one mail order business. If F is such that profits are negative,
the monopolist opens no mail order business at all. o
Proposition 1 contains the main result of this section. In contrast with lemma 1 and6
2, I allow the monopolist to sell by stores and mail order businesses. The proposition
assumes that both wa}~s of selling are profitable.
Proposition 1: (aJ The monopolist opens a single mai! order store if ~ f F C 2tF;
(6J he opens O.St~F stores on the circle if .p t F~ 2tF: (c) he net;er operates óoth
types of business.
Proof: If the monopolist can offer both types of selling policies, he chooses p;. q;, n~, nm
and i so as to maximize
r(P„4~,n~,n,n,x) - 2n~iP; t min(l,nm)(I - 2n~i)9; - (n~ t n,n)F
subject to 0 C i C O.~~n~ and n~.nm 7 0. The variable p, (q;) denotes the price at
a store on the circle (at a mail order business). The number of stores, n~ and nm, are
interpreted similarly. From the profit function, it is clear that at most one mail order
business will be opened, if any. The consumer who is indifferent between buying at a
store on the circle and at the mail order business is characterized by q; f y~ - p; t ti - r.
Substitute this into the profit function, and differentiation with respect to i shows that
the function is monotonically non-decreasing as ]ong as y~ ? 2ti. Since 0 c i G 0.5~n~.
i - min(O.~~n~,0.5y~t). If y~~t C l~n~. the profit function becomes
ïr(n~, nm) - 2n~2t(r - t~t ) f min(1. nm)(1 - 2n~~ )(r - yo) -(n~ f n,,,)F.
If. in equilibrium, the monopolist uses both selling policies. (1 -2n~Y~2t)(r-r) , nmF.
.after some rearranging. the function becomes
z
~(n~, nm) - r-,v - nmF f n~(Zt - F).
ïr(n~, nm) is non-decreasing in n~ as long as Y 1 2tF. In this case, n~ can be increased
up to the point where,;~t - l~n~. Ever}' mail order business, therefore, cannot attract
a positive market share. Since profits are decreasing in nm, no mail order business is
opened. In the other case, in which Y G 2tF, í"r(n~,nm) is strictly decreasing in n~
and no stores on the circle are opened. The optimal number of one mail order business
results if profits are nonnegative.
If l~n~ C Y ~t. the profit function becomes ( after rearranging)
"r,(n~,nm)-r- t -(n~fn,,,)F
2n~7
Since 8ïr(n~.nm)~8nm G 0, the optimal number of mail order stores equals zero. Dif-
ferentiate with respect to n~, and the optimal number n~ of stores on the circle equals
O.~t~F. If the resulting profit r- 2tF is nonnegative, the monopolist opens a number
of O.~t~F stores on the circle (see Lemma 1). The monopolist now makes the optimal
choice by comparing both profits. IÍ r-~- F~ r- 2tF, if and only if y~ F~ 2t F,
the monopolist prefers to open one and only one mail order business ( see lemma 2).
Otherwise, he only opens the optimal number of stores on the circle. t]
In other words, the monopolist either opens retail stores or one mail order business. The
intuition is as follows. Suppose opening a single mail order business is profitable. In
addition. suppose the opening of one or more retail stores together with the mail order
business yields extra profits, despite the additional fixed set-up costs. Then, ignoring
integer problems, the monopolist's optimal decision is to serve the whole market by
retail stores. In that case, the mail order business serves no consumers. Therefore, the
monopolist opens no mail order business. If, on the contrary, opening the extra retail
store does not yield extra profits, he opens a single mail order business.
4 Oligopoly
Let there be a fixed number of firms in the market, indexed bv i- 2, .....~-. The model
presented in section 2 is analyzed as a two-stage game. In the first stage. firms decide on
whether to become traditional stores (and consequentlv are appointed a position on the
circle) or mai] order businesses (and consequentl}~ have their location at the center of the
circle). In the second stage, haeing observed each other~s decision in the first stage and
the corresponding location, they compete in prices. I soh-e the game for its Subgame
Perfect `ash Equilibria in pure strategies by the method of backward induction.
Before moving to the two relevant cases, consider the case in which more t han one firm
operates as a mail order business. A standard Bertrand result appears for these firnts,
since they are not differentiated at all with respect to each other. Price competition
results in charging a price equal to marginal cost. Since set-up costs are strictly positive,
in pure strategies at most one firm will open a mail order business. This results in twoi1
possible alternatives: (i) no firm operates a mail order business, and (ii) exactly one firm
sells through the mail.
The first case is identical to Salop's circle model of product differentiation. All ~~'
firms decide to open a store on the circle. The distance between every pair of firms
equals l~.N'. Suppose firm i chooses a price p;, and that p is the price charged by the
other firms. Then, a consumer located at distance a from firm i, with x E [0, 1~.V], is
indifferent between buying from firm i and its neighbor if
1
P;~-tx-Ptt(~~'-~) (1)
The difference (1~:V - x) is the distance between the indifferent consumer's location a
and the neighboring firm. Solving (1) for x, one obtaíns firm i's demand at both sides.
Define profits as total demand times price, and firm i's profit equals
P-P~ftl-tiP
~~(P~-P) - ~xP; - t
Optimizing this with respect to p;, p; - 0.5(p~-t~.V) is firm i's optimal price, given p. B}~
symmetry. set p, - p. This yields the symmetric solution, so that p; - p' - t~~'.' Firm
i~s market share then becomes 1~.V. It follows that every firm's gross profit, expressed
as a function of the number of firms a', equals
t
Fs(-~ ) - `-s
Expression (3) will be referred to as the S-equilibrium profit.
(3)
In the second case, onlv one firm decides to become a mail order business: the other
(.`' - 1) firms are equally spaced around the circle. Each of the (:~' - 1) firms on the
circle is at distance 1~(.~' - 1) from its two neighbors on the circle. Each firm i on the
circle now faces three competitors: the two nearest ones on the circle and the mail order
business. In between even two neighboring firms on the circle. two indifferent consumers
~This analysis also assumes that the matket equilibrium lies in the competitive region of firm i's
demand cune. Tha[ is, the reservauon price r~ 3t~2 (see Salop (1979) for the exposition).9
can be defined. One is indifferent between firm i and its neighboring firm on the circle.
Given a price p charged by this competitor on the circle, this indifferent consumer is
located at y, where
1
P,tty-á~t((.V-1)-y) (~)
as long as y c 1~(.V - 1). The other is indifferent between firm i and the mail order
business. Given a price q charged by the mail order business, this indifferent consumer
is located at z such that
P~ftz-qfY (~)
Figure 1 clearly illustrates that if y G z, the mail order business gains no positive market
share. and consequently, zero profits. If y~ z. the mail order business can serve a positive
share oi the market ( see figure 2).
qt`~
P P P P
~ y z 11(N-1) 0 z y 1J(N-1)
heure 1: the mail order business figure '?: the mail order business
has no market share. has a posití~-e market share.10
Firm i's total demand D, is defined as
2y if o ~ p, 5 2(4 t~) -(n t tl(-ti - 1))
D,(P,. n, 9) - 24 if 2(9 f~a) -(á f tl(-~ - 1)) ~ p, ~ q t~
0 if qf~SP~
(6)
Then, profits for firm i on the circle are
r~(P~.P~4) - D~(P~.P~9)P~. Í~)
Since the mail order business's location is in the center of the circle. it faces (N - 1)
neighbors. For a given price p, charged by every firm i on the circle, the mail order
business first competes for the consumers in the middle between every two firms on the
circle, i.e. at distance 1~(2(.~' - 1)). The consumer, who is indifferent between bu~-ing
at firm i or at the mail order business charging a price q, is located at ~ such that
P,-~tz`-q-~;?. (8)
Equation (8) applies for each side of all (.N - 1) firms on the circle. Therefore, the mail
order business's total demand Dtir is defined as
0
D.u(P~-4) - (~1. ~~~(P~ - r- 9 t s~:~~-i~ )
if g1p,~-t~2(.~'-1)-~
if P~ -Y ~ 9 C P, f t~2(.ti~ - 1) - y
if 9CP~-v
(9)
The profit for the mail order business eyuals
~,v(P~,4) - D.tir(P~~4)q- (10)
Expression ( 10) is continuous and quasi-conca~~e in q. Optimizing expression (7) with
respect to p„ and expression ( 10) with respect to q, the first-order conditions are
1
P~ - q 2 ~. (11)11
9 - p; - ~? -f t~2(N - 1) (12)
2
if all firms on the circle and the mail order business have a positive market share. L sing
the assumption of symmetry (p; - p; - p) for the firms on the circle and using q- q
for the mail order business, define the Nash-equilibrium (p",q") of the pricing-game by
a mill price of
2y~ft~(N-1)
6
at every store on the circle, and a mill price of
(13)
t~(N - 1) - ~ (1~)
q" - 3
at the mail order business. If t~(4(a'- 1)) ~~, the price the mail order business charges
is higher than the firms on the circle charge. For higher values of y~, lower prices result.
The price the mail order business and the firms on the circle charge are always lower
compared to the situation in which firms can operate only on the circle.
Substitute expressions (13) and (14) into (7) and (10) to see that the profits
expressed as a function of the number of firms ~ti' are
~~(a') - lst((,v t 1) t 2.~)~ (1')
for ecerv firm on the circle. and
2(.~"-I) t
~.tir( -~ ) - 9t ( ( a" - 1)
-y)' (16)
for the mail order business. The expressions (1~) and (16) will be referred to as the
:tl-equilibrium profits.





The function h(.V) is non-negative for all .ti' 1 3; furthermore, h(3) - 0. h(x) - 0 and
h(2) c 0.
Proposition 2: (aJ If Y C h(1V), then exactly one firm operates a mail order business
and the remaining ftrms locate on the cincle. (b) Otherwise, the unique equilibrium in
pure strategies is that all firms locate on the circle.
Proof : Consider firm i's profit if all other firms are located on the circle. If firm i
decides to locate on the circle, its profit equals t~.1~'Z, as can be seen from expression
(3). If, however, firm i decides to become a mail order business, its profit is 2((a- -
1)~9t)(t~(.V - 1) - cp)~ by ( 16). Therefore, firm i finds it optimal to start up a mail
order business if t~.ti" c 2((.V - 1)~9t)(t~(N - 1) - y)z. This condition is equivalent
to ~ C h(:~'). Given firm i's decision to become a mail order business, the remaining
firms on the circle have a profit of a~(:~') -(1~18t)(f~(:V - 1) f 2y)~ by ( 16). It is not
profitable for an}~ of the firms on the circle to switch to the center and become mail order
businesses. The standard Bertrand argument implies that switching to the center would
reduce their profits to zero. Since r,~(.V) 1 0. the firms on the circle do not switch to
the center. This establishes part (a). If, however, t~.V~ ~ 2((a' - 1)~9t)(t~(.~" - 1) - r Iz.
the opposite inequality holds, i.e. Y) h(.V). Firm i locates on the circle and no other
firm switches to the center. This establishes part (b). t]
Yroposition 2 implies that if some firm sets up a mail order business, the cost of sending
the good through the mail should be small enough. In that case. the parametric con-
stellations result in an .Ll-equilibrium. Since ;~ is non-negative. and in an .LI-equilibrium
not larger than h(.~~), we hace that h(.~') ) 0. From the properties of this function.
the lower bound on the number of firms in an 1f-equilibrium is ~~ 1 3. The intuition
is that a firm has an incentive to open a mail order business onl}~ if its profit as a firm
on the circle is relativeh~ small. In an .Lf-equilibrium. the mail order business foregoes
some market power b}~ a decrease in the equilibrium prices. Therefore, a single firm on
the circle has no incentive to become a mail order business if the gain in market share
is not large enough. The mail order business has a larger market share in comparison
~cith the firms' market shares in the S~quilibrium. Indeed. Y C h(.`') implies that13
(2(N - 1)~3t)(t~(N - 1) -~) ~ I~N. As ~ increases from 0 to h(N), the mail order
business's market share decreases from 2~3 to 2(.N - 1)~N. The total market share for
the firms on the circle increases from 1~3 to 1- 2(N - 1)~N. The mail order business's
market share, therefore, always exceeds that of the firms on the circle. For low values
of :V, the equilibrium mill price at a store is lower than at the mail order business. For
high values of .V, the opposite relationship holds.
In the S-equilibrium, each firm competes with its two neighbors in only a direct way. The
cross-price elasticities are positive for neighboring firms, but zero for all other firms. [;s-
ing the terminology of Anderson and de Palma (1990), there is localized competition. In
the .~1-equilibrium, the firm in the center competes directly with every firm on the circle.
Clearl}~, this generates some form of nonlocalized competition, as the cross-price elastic-
ity (BD,~Sq)(q~D;) is positive and identical for all i. The mail order business shoulders
itself in between every firm on the circle. The firms on the circle have onlv one direct
competitor. i.e. the mail order business. A small change in their own price, affects onh~
the mail order business~s market share. The cross-price elasticity (c7D.y~óp;j(p,~D,y) is
positive and identical for all i. The cross-price elasticity (BD;~óp~j(p~~D,) equals zero
for all j~ z. They are engaged in some form of localized competition. Figure :3 shows an






market shares in an LI-equilibrium with .V - ï.14
Proposition 3: The frrms on fhe circle earn higher profits in the S-equilibrium than
they do in the :L~-equilibnum: as(:V) ~ a~(.v).
Proof: Expression (3) is strictly larger than expression (15) if and only if ~ C t(3~ f.~~-
1~2(,v - 1)). Compare the right-hand side of this inequality with h(~ti') to see that
t(3~J2.V - 1~2(,1' - 1)) ~ h(~V) if and onfy if f~ N~(N - 1) - 2~(:~' - 1). For all
.ti' ~ 2, the right-hand side of the latter inequality is an increasing function. By applying
1'Hópital's rule, it reaches its maximum of 1 for ,ti' approaching infinity. Since y~ C h(.~')
in the .L~equilibrium, the result follows. ~
Proposition 3 holds because prices in the M-equilibrium are lower than they are in the
Sequilibrium. As already noted before, the mail order business has a larger market
share vis-à-Lis the firms' market shares in the S-equilibrium. Therefore, lower prices and
market shares for firms on the circle result in lower pro6ts.
5 Free Entry Equilibrium
This section studies entry into the industry. In order to have a finite number of firms.
I introduce a fixed set-up cost of production F. The oligopoly two-stage game of the
pre~.ious section is now enlarged by an additional stage. The three-stage game proceeds
as follows: In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not it will enter the market.
Having observed the number of firms entering the market, the entrants play the twro-stage
game of the precious section. Those who do not enter recei~~e zero profits.
The precious section established that the S- and af-equilibrium are possible candidates
satisfying the subgame perfectness condition. Our concept of free-entn. equilibriurn
requires that entering firms earn non-negative profits, and all other firms anticipate
non-positi~-e profits when entering (see Anderson, de Palma. and Thisse. 1992). This
moti~~ates the following two definitions:
Definition 1: ~~S is the number of firms in a free-entry S-eyuilibrium if (i) r,s( ~"~) - F:
and (ii) rs(:~~s) ? r.vf(-~s).15
Condition (i) ensures that all firms make zero profits. IC implies that NS - t~F,
by (3). Condition (ii) guarantees that with the equilibrium number of firms in the
market, no firm wants to switch to a mail order business. The condition is equivalent
to ;~ ~ h(:~`S) (i.e., the condition in Proposition 2). In the free-entry S-equilibrium,
therefore, Y ? h( t~F).
Definition 2: .~'~f is the number of firms in a free-entry Alequilibrium if (i) r~(a'.u) -
F: and (ii) rr.M(:v!y) ? rs(:tititf).
The first condition ensures that all firms on the circle make zero profits. Proposition
3 established that rr~(:V) c a.y(N). It follows that only the firms on the circle must
satisfy the zero-profit conditions for free entry. The second condition guarantees that
with the equilibrium number of firms in the market, exactly one firm wants to switch to
the mail order business. Define the following function:
g(~~`:u)-2( 1stF- ti,t 1). (18)
' j.tii -
The function g(.) is increasing and, by (18), the equality g(:Vy) - Y represents the zero-
profit condition for the firms on the circle. Condition (ii) in definition 2 is equi~.alent to
~ C h( ~~,~y). Therefore, :~'y satisfies the requirements (i) and (ii) of definition 2 if and
only if g(-~.y) - Y C~(-~.:it)- a
Proposition 9 Let rs(.1's) - r,~(.b'y) - F; then :VS ~ ~"Lr. That is, if .~-N and .~"~
are determined by the wero-profit condition. the number of firms in the S-equilibrium is
higher than if would be in the !Yl-equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose ~S C~~'yt. Since expression (15) is decreasing in ~~. rrc(.`~~t) c
~c~ ~s) Proposition 3 implies that in case there is a mail order business, the profits
of the firms on the circle are smaller compared to the number under the free-entr}- S-
equilibrium. Therefore, ~~(~~s) C~s(-~s). The íree-entrv S-equilibrium requires that
-s(.~~~) - F. But then ~r~(,ti'~t) G F, and :1';y cannot be the number of firms under a
free-entr}~ equilibrium. .4 contradiction. ~
'Assume [hat F G 1~18. such that with .~~;y - 2. a firm on the circle is not prevented from entering
the market.16
Proposition 4 states that the number of firms in the free-entry S-equilibrium is larger
than it would be in the free entry .N-equilibrium. Therefore, the market with a mail order
business is more competitive. This accords with the result that nonlocalized competition
yields fewer firms in a free-entry equilibrium than it would in localized competition (see
Deneckere and Rothschild. 1992). The conditions for an S- and .1~equilibrium are now
analyzed.
Lemma 3: (i) h(3) - 0 and h(:V) 1 0 jor alt ,V ) 3; (iiJ g(3) 1 0 ij and on(y iJ
t~F C 72: ( iii) 9'(:V) ~ h'(:1~ ) for all ,ti' ) 3; (iL~J 9(.h') 1 h(.ti") jor al( tti' large enough.
The proof of Lemma 3 is relegated to the Appendix. From Lemma 3, the following
results can be obtained.
Proposition 5: (iJ :Vy is increasing in :p, and decreasing in F; (ii) !J a free-entry
.11-equilibrium ezists, then .V,y ~ 3.
Proof: (i) Inspection of expression (18) yields the comparative static results: (ii) From
Lemma 3. g'( ~~) ~ 0. Proposition ~ establishes that no equilibrium exists if g(3) ~ 0.
Since :p 1 0, a'i1 ? 3 if an .b!-equilibrium exists. t7
An increase in y implies more friction in the market and pre~~ents the mail order business
from decreasing the prices drastically. Therefore, more firms can enter the market.
Proposition 6: (iJ Let F C t~72: then there e2ists a Y) 0. such that an 11-eqvi(ibrium
u~ith free entry ezists if and only ij0 G y C i~. (iiJ !f F 1 2~72. free entry does not
resutt ia an .L1-equilibrium.
Proof: ( i) By Lemma 3, there exists a a' such that h(~~j - g(.~-) - Y. Since g(3) C 0
and g'( ~~) ~ h'(.~') for all ~~ 1 3 with g'(,~') ~ 0. for y C;, there is a unique .~" such that
g( ~') -,r G h(.~'): (ii) Since h(3) - 0 and g'(~') 1 h'(.~~) for all ~~ ? 3. the condition for
a free-entr}- .L1-equilibrium 0 C g(a') - y G h( ~") ( as stated in definition 2) can never
be satisfied. O
If the fixed set-up cost is too large compared to the marginal cost of transportation, the
zero-profit condition for firms on the circle cannot be satisfied.17
Proposition 7: Let Niy and 1V5 satisfy the zero-profit conditions of the free-erztry equi-
fibrium. (a) Let h(:1~. ,ir) G h(NS). Then, (i~ the S-equilibrium with free entry is unique
if h(.~"s) G Y; (ii~ if :,~ G h(:V;y), the .11-equilibrium with free entry is unique; (iiiJ if
h(-1''y) G~ G h(.NS), no pure strategy equilibrium exists. (bJ If h(NS) G h(N;u), then
for a!1 (iJ ,p G h(.NS), the af-equi[ibrium is unique; (iiJ ~) h(;1r;y), the S-equilibrium
is unique; (iiiJ h(A's) G ;p G h(.V;y) both the free entry S-equilibrium and the free entry
.1!-equi(ibrium coexist.
Proof: (a) (i) from definition 1, a free-entry S-equilibrium exists, since ~ ) h(.NS) holds,
while condition (ii) of definition 2 is violated; ( ii) Similarly, no free-entry S-equilibrium
exists, since condition (ii) of definition 1 is violated, while definition 2 holds, (iii) In
the same fashion, both conditions for the free-entry S- and M-equilibrium are violated if
h(.ti ir) G Y G h(.1~'S). (b) can be proven in a similar fashion. O
A numerical example can illustrate part (a) of Proposition 7. Take t- 100 and F- L It
follows that .ti-S - 10, and so h(:~'S) ~ 4.04. If :~ - h(.VS), .ti',N ~ 3.91 and h(:Vu) ~ 2.56,
the free entry S-equilibrium is thus unique, since h(:~'. ,y) G h(.ti'S) - ~. For every
r ~ 4.0~1 ~ h(.`'s). we are in the free-entry S-equilibrium. If Y- 1, the only equilibrium
is the free-entry :L1-equilibrium, since Vjy ~ 3.4ï, and thus ~, G h(a"N) ~ 1.59 G h(a'S).
If. however, y~ - 2, h(.~-tir) ~- 1.9, and no equilibrium exists, since h(a~.u) G~ G h(.~"S).
.~s a numerical example of part ( b) of Proposition ï, take t- 200 and F- 1. It follo~es
that -~'G ti 14.14 and h(.ti-S) ti 3.48. If ~- 1, then :Yy ~ 4.45, and so h( ~'S) G h(a'Lr) ~
6.6-1 and the free-entry :1!-equilibrium is unique. If T , is large enough. the free-entn- S-
equilibrium is unique: e.g. ~- 10, .Vhr - 6 and so h(.~"S) G h(a';y) ~ 8.3ï G Y. For
intermediate values of ~. the free-entry :~l- and S-equilibrium ma}' co-exist; for instance
if Y- 4, it follows that .~"tir ~ 4.85. and so h(.~"S) G.,; G h(.~"y) c- 7.36.
6 Welfare Analysis
From the social planner's point of view, the socially optimal selling policy minimizes the
sum of tota] transportation costs and set-up costs of production. If the social planner can
onl}' open stores on the circle. as in Salop (1979). he opens f~4F stores. Straightforward
calculations show that total costs equal tF. If the social planner can only open nm
mail order businesses, it is optimal to open onl}~ one. This generates a social cost oflt~
ytF.9
Proposition 8: The social planner opens t~4F stores on the circle if y-F F~ tF.
Otheru;ise, he opens one mai] order business.
Proof: If tt-ie social plaï~ner can offer both selling policies, he has to r:.inimize
z
w~(n~,nm,x) - (2a - r)2n~~ -F 2nct~ -h (n~ f n,n)F (19)
~
subject to 0 C x C O.~~n~; n~, nm ~ 0. The variable x is the distance of the indifferent
consumer between two neighboring stores on the circle.
Optimizing this expression with respect to x, its optimal value x' satisfies x' -
min(:a~t, O.~~n~). Substituting this back into expression (19) , the optimization problem
reduces to









If ,;~t c 0.5~n~, expression ( 20) simplifies to
z
Li;'Ín~, nm) - r- n~( t - F) f nmF.
The term (YZ~t-F) is the marginal contribution of a store to the tota] cost minimization.
If Y~~t - F C 0. if and onl}' if Y C tF, n~ should be as small as possible, i.e. 0. This
results in a total welfare cost of y f F if nm - 1.
If, however. .r2~t - F , 0, n~ should be as large as possible. Hacing a maximum at t~2Y.
the expression becomes
tF
[i'(n~. n,,,) - 2 rt- n,,,F f 2. (21)
Y
Since ,; - O.St~n~. the constraint is binding. Substituting this into expression ( 21), the
social planner faces the following minimization problem:
I~ (Rc, nm) -
~n~ ~ (nc
~ nm)F (~~)
9The cost of transportation by mail equals y per unít of delivery Since the technology operates w~th
or without a mail order business, i[s cost is only marginal.19
Expression (22) coincides with the minirnization problem the social planner faces if
Y~t ~ 0.5n~ and yields an optimal outcome of (n~,nm) -( t~4F,0). This outcome
results in a total welfare cost equal to tF. The social planner, therefore, prefers to
open the optimal number of stores n~ if cg ~ F~ tF. Otherwise, he opens one mail
order business. p
Proposition 8 tells us that, similar to the monopolist, the social planner will operate only
one type of business. Indeed, suppose ~ t F C t F and the social planner opens a store
in addition to the mail order business. The consumer located at x- c,~~t from the store
is indifferent between the mail order business and the store. The total transportation
costs are therefore reduced by yZ ~t. If the additional fixed set-up cost F~ YZ~t. it is
not worthwhile to open the store. Since a t F G tF, it is not optimal to open this
additional store. Similarly, if F c~Z~t, it follows that ~ f F~ tF. In other words.
it is not optimal to open a mail order business in addition to the stores on the circle.
also. the surplus per consumer is independent of the number of mail order businesses.
Therefore. the social planner opens only one. Of course, a higher t and lower y make the
mail order business constellation more likely. Any increase in F favors the mail order
business constellation if n~ 1 1.
figure ~:
comoarison between the social planner and the monopolist in (;,. F)-space.20
Propositions 1 and 8 make it possible to compare the monopolist and the social planner.
Figure 4 graphically illustrates this comparison in (y~, F)-space. If y~ c tF - F.
the social planner and monopolist open only one mail order business ( region I). If
y~ 1 2tF-F, both open the optimal number of stores (region III). For any tF-F C
w~ 2iF - F, the social planner opens the optimal number of stores on the circle,
whereas the monopolist opens only one mail order business (region 11). The intuition
is that the social planner is interested in the average consumer, whereas the monopolist
seeks to serve the marginal consumer. Therefore, the monopolist locates closer to the
marginal consumer than does the social planner. A higher critical ~ supports this idea.
It is, therefore. of no surprise that the social planner opens less stores compared to the
monopolist.
The oligopoly and free-entry analysis showed that firms on the circle and a mail order
business can coexist as an equilibrium. From proposition 4, the number of firms in the
free-entn~ Sequilibrium is larger compared to the af-equilibrium. This result weakens
the familiar proposition that competition cceates too much variety compared to the social
optimum (see e.g. Salop (19ï9)). Continuing the numerical example. take t- 100, F- 1
and y- 1. The number of firms in a Salop model equals 10, whereas only 3.1ï firms (of
which one as a mail order business) enter the market in the free entry .W-equilibrium.
The monopolist opens only one mail order business. The free entry .11-equilibrium is
suboptimal, sínce firms on the circle and a mail order business appear. In the social
optimum, only one mail order business appears.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined a spatial model on the circle where firms can either sell by a
store or b}- a mail order business. Selling b}- a store implies a transportation cost for
the consumers that increases with distance. In contrast, selling by a mail order business
implies a fixed cost for the consumer, regardless of his location. In a free-entry context, at
most one mail order business emerges. Competition increases and, as a consequence. the
number oí firms entering the market is lower, compared to the well-known Salop model.
The mail order business competes with every firm on the circle. and therefore engages
in nonlocalized competition. The stores on the circle face only one local competitor -21
-i.e. the mail order business. In the monopoly and the social optimum. stores and mail
order businesses never appear together.
The result that at most one mail order business will emerge, of course, depends on the
implicit assumption that consumers are perfectly informed about the existence of the mail
order business. The model, however, can be modified by introducing advertisements, for
example. Then, consumers are informed about the existence of the products offered. .a
mail order business attracts consumers depending on its advertising costs. In addition,
this model assumes that consumers are perfectly aware of the quality of the product. If
quality inspection before purchase is costly, a mail order business ma}' have a strategic
disadvantage. Finally, in a multi-country framework, the mail order businesses may
be able to use consumers' addresses as a price discriminating device --yet another
interesting topic for future research.22
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3:
(i) h(3) - 0, obvious. h(.ti') ~ 0 for all N~ 3 if and only if N~( .N - 1) 1 3~f. Since
.V~( .~" - 1) is strictly increasing in .v and equals 3~ f at ~ti' - 3, the result follows.
(ii) g(3) ? 0 if and only if t~F C ï2. From evaluation of expression ( 18) at .ti' - 3, we
find that t~F - ï2. Since g(:V) is strictly increasing, the result follows.
(iii) g'(:V) - h'(.V) ~ 0 for all :b' ~ 3 if and only if 3t~(2(a' - 1)2) ~ 3ft(3a' -
2)~(4:`'(a' - 1)~,1"). It can easily be checked that this holds for all N~ 3.
(iL-) From ( i) and (ii), h(3) - 0 and g(3) C 0 if and only if t~F ~ 72. Since g'(.1') 1 0
for all finite :V and g'(.~') - h'(.1') ~ 0 for all :`' 1 3 from (iii), g(a') 1 h(:V) for some
:V ~ 3. If t~F c ï2, then g(3) ~ h(3) - 0. o23
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